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21 Introduction
Repeated games with complete information are known to have multiple equilibria.
The prominent result in this direction is the folk theorem which asserts that in games
with perfect monitoring and perfectly rational players, every feasible and individually
rational payoﬀ can be sustained by an equilibrium of the repeated game. A more
realistic model to study involves games with imperfect monitoring, where players
observe imperfectly other players’ actions, and bounded rationality, where players
have limited information processing abilities. Typically these two problems have
been studied separately in the literature. A notable exception is a recent paper by
Cole and Kocherlakota (2005).
The literature on games with imperfect monitoring seeks to characterize the set
of equilibrium payoﬀs (see e.g., Lehrer (1992a,b), Abreu et al. (1990), Fudenberg and
Levine (1994), Tomala (1998), Renault and Tomala (2004)), and the literature on
games with bounded rationality examines whether equilibrium payoﬀs of the unre-
stricted repeated game can be approximated by equilibrium payoﬀs of the repeated
game with bounded rationality (see e.g., Rubinstein (1986), Abreu and Rubinstein
(1988), Kalai and Stanford (1988), Lehrer (1988, 1994) Ben-Porath (1990, 1993),
Sabourian (1998), Neyman (1998), Bavly and Neyman (2005)).
The present paper aims at blending these two approaches in the analysis of a
minority game. In this class of games each player has two actions and aims at choosing
the action that is less popular among all players. The game is repeated and after each
stage the most popular (or equivalently the less popular) action is publicly announced.
In many real life situations it is preferable to be in the minority. Think for
instance of a residential suburban area that is linked to downtown by two main
roads. Commuters have to decide every morning which road to take and, for obvious
reasons, they all want to avoid traﬃc. Since the commuters typically do not recognize
their fellow commuters on the road, but only perceive the existence of traﬃc, this
phenomenon can be modelled as a game with imperfect public monitoring. Attention
to these phenomena originates in some papers by Arthur (1994, 1999). In general
this class of games is interesting when several agents must take decentralized decision
on whether to access a scarce resource, knowing that at most a ﬁxed number of
them will be able to enjoy its beneﬁts. Similar situations have been analyzed by
the empirical economic literature on market entry games (see e.g., Selten and G¨ uth
(1982), Ochs (1990, 1995), Rapoport et al. (2002), Erev and Rapoport (1998)). In
these models players must decide independently whether to enter a market (and
incur an entry cost). Since capacity is limited, the entrants will reap a reward only
if their number is smaller than a ﬁxed threshold. This clearly creates a problem
of coordination. Similar ideas have been used to analyze speculative behavior in
ﬁnancial markets, and minority games have been used as a formalization of concepts,
like the contrarian investment strategy, previously considered in empirical studies (see
e.g., De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Chan (1988)). Most of the literature on the topic
3can be found in theoretical physics journals and has a non-strategic approach. The
reader is referred to the recent books by Challet et al. (2005) and Coolen (2005) for
a history of the problem, its statistical-mechanics analysis, and some applications to
ﬁnancial markets. An analysis of minority games from the learning viewpoint can be
found in Bottazzi et al. (2003, 2002), Bottazzi and Devetag (2004). A minority game
is basically a repeated coordination game, the speciﬁc feature being that players want
to coordinate negatively and be where their fellow players are not. The stage game
used in a repeated minority game is strongly related to congestion games introduced
by Rosenthal (1973) and to crowding games studied by Milchtaich (1998, 2000).
Renault et al. (2005) are the ﬁrst to consider a minority game from a traditional
strategic viewpoint. In their model an odd number of players have to choose simul-
taneously one of two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room receive a
reward of one euro. The others receive nothing. The game is repeated over time. At
each step, after the players’ action choices, only a public signal (the majority room)
is announced to everybody, so players do not observe the actions or the payoﬀs of
the other players. Renault et al. (2005) prove an undiscounted folk theorem for this
game, and characterize the set of uniform equilibrium payoﬀs, i.e. they show that
any feasible payoﬀ is an equilibrium payoﬀ. In particular, they construct a uniform
equilibrium where the payoﬀ of each player is zero. It is interesting to notice that a
folk theorem exists for this game even if no identiﬁability condition ` a la Fudenberg
et al. (1994) holds.
The paper by Renault et al. (2005) is in the tradition of repeated games with
imperfect public monitoring. Examples of such games go back to Rubinstein (1979),
Rubinstein and Yaari (1983), and Radner (1985) with reference to principal-agent
models and by Green and Porter (1984) with reference to oligopoly. More systematic
analyses of games with imperfect public monitoring have been provided by Lehrer
(1989) and Tomala (1998) in the undiscounted case and Abreu et al. (1990) Fudenberg
et al. (1994), Fudenberg and Levine (1994) in the discounted case. Most papers
focus on public equilibria, namely, equilibria in which each player uses only strategies
that depend on the public signal and not on her private history. More recently a
considerable attention has been devoted to games with imperfect private monitoring.
See for instance the whole issue of Journal of Economic Theory dedicated to this
topic, with the introduction by Kandori (2002).
Discounted and ﬁnitely repeated versions of the minority game are studied by
Renault et al. (2006). Their model deals with an intermediate situation where the
signal is public, but strategies are private, namely, they depend on the public signal
and on the private history of each player. Games with public monitoring and private
strategies have been studied by Mailath et al. (2002) and Kandori and Obara (2006).
Mailath et al. (2002) deal with ﬁnitely repeated games and show three examples
of substantially diﬀerent behavior of private versus public strategies in games with
imperfect public monitoring. Kandori and Obara (2006) consider inﬁnitely repeated
games and provide a method to construct private strategies that are more eﬃcient
4than public strategies.
In the present paper a three-player minority game with imperfect public monitor-
ing and bounded recall is studied, and only pure strategies are considered. Bounded
recall and public signal is a typical assumption for minority games in the physics
literature. We ﬁrst analyze public equilibria. Public strategy proﬁle in those games
can be represented as the choice of a subgraph in a de Bruijn graph, together with a
coloring of the vertices, i.e. a rule that assigns each vertex to a player. Using these
tools we compute some equilibria.
We look then at the asymptotic behavior of the set of bounded recall equilibrium
payoﬀs. For any game with bounded recall and imperfect public monitoring, the set
of public equilibria with bounded recall is a subset of the set of public equilibria
with unbounded recall and the set of public-equilibrium payoﬀs increases with the
size of the recall. But, for some games, it may not converge to the set of unbounded
recall public equilibrium payoﬀs. For instance, consider a repeated game with a
public blank signal. Since player have no information, the set of unbounded recall
equilibrium payoﬀs is the convex hull of stage-Nash payoﬀs. In a game with bounded
recall and public strategies, the public memory is always empty, so players always
choose the same action and bounded recall public equilibria are nothing but stage-
Nash equilibria.
For the minority game, we show that the set of public equilibrium payoﬀs does
converge to the set of unbounded recall public equilibrium payoﬀs, as the length of
recall increases.
The set of private equilibria lacks the nice properties of public equilibria and we
exhibit a private equilibrium with recall 3 whose payoﬀ does not lie in the set of
unbounded-recall-private-equilibrium payoﬀs. These results are somehow connected
to Mailath et al. (2002) and Kandori and Obara (2006), who also compare public
and private equilibria, but, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst that
considers such a comparison in a bounded recall framework.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a model of repeated games
with imperfect public monitoring and bounded recall. Section 3 deals with a minority
game and gives the main results. In Section 4 examples of other repeated games are
considered. Finally Section 5 contains the proofs of the results.
2 Repeated games with public signals
2.1 Description of the model




In this setting N is a set of players, for each i ∈ N, Ai is the set of actions available
to player i, A := ×i∈N Ai is the set of action proﬁles, and the map gi : A → R is the
5payoﬀ function for player i. Denote by g : A → RN the vector payoﬀ function (gi)i∈N.
For every i ∈ N, put A−i = ×j∈N,j6=i Aj, therefore a−i ∈ A−i will be a shortcut for
(aj : j 6= i) ∈ ×j∈N,j6=i Aj. Consider then a set of signals U and a mapping ` : A → U.
In the whole paper the sets N,Ai,U are assumed nonempty and ﬁnite.
This game is repeated over time. At each round t = 1,2,..., players choose
actions and if at ∈ A is the action proﬁle at stage t, they observe a public signal
ut = `(at) before proceeding to the next stage. The set of histories of length t ≥ 0
for player i is Hi
t := (Ai × U)t, Hi
0 being a singleton, and Hi = ∪t≥0Hi
t is the set of
all histories for player i.
When U = A and ` is the identity mapping on A, each player fully observes the
action proﬁle. When the function ` is constant, no player receives information on the
action proﬁle. These two cases will be referred to as perfect monitoring and trivial
monitoring, respectively.
A strategy for player i is a mapping σi : Hi → Ai. The set of strategies for player
i is denoted by Σi, and similar conventions are adopted as for actions: Σ = ×j∈N Σj,
Σ−i = ×j∈N,j6=i Σj. A proﬁle of strategies σ = (σi)i∈N generates a unique history
(at(σ),ut(σ))t≥1 ∈ (A × U)∞, where, for each t, ut(σ) = `(at(σ)). In the whole paper
only pure strategies are considered.





t=1 gi(at(σ)), and γi(σ) = limT→∞ γi
T(σ), when the limit exists.
Let Γ∞ be the inﬁnitely repeated game. The next deﬁnition recalls the concept
of uniform equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A strategy proﬁle σ is a uniform equilibrium of Γ∞ if
(a) for all i ∈ N, γi(σ) exists.




Denote by E∞ the set of uniform equilibrium payoﬀs of Γ∞, i.e., the set of vectors
(γi(σ))i∈N, where σ is a uniform equilibrium of Γ∞.
2.2 Public strategies
Deﬁnition 2.2. Let i ∈ N. The strategy σi ∈ Σi is called public if for all t ≥ 1, and
for all histories of length t, h = (ai
1,u1,...,ai
t,ut) and h0 = (bi
1,v1,...,bi
t,vt),








In words a public strategy depends only on public signals. The set of public
strategies of player i is denoted by b Σi. A strategy proﬁle σ is a public equilibrium if
it is a uniform equilibrium and each player’s strategy is public. The corresponding
set of equilibrium payoﬀs is denoted by b E∞. In the case of perfect monitoring, any
strategy is public, since the public history contains all the past.
6In repeated games with unbounded recall every pure strategy is equivalent to a
public strategy. Knowing her own strategy and the history of public signals, a player
can deduce the actions she played in the past (see e.g. Tomala (1998)). More precisely
the following lemma holds.
Lemma 2.3. For every σi ∈ Σi, there exists b σi ∈ b Σi such that for all τ−i ∈ Σ−i and
for each stage t
at(σ
i,τ
−i) = at(b σ
i,τ
−i).
The proof is straightforward: the action played by σ at the ﬁrst stage depends on
σi only, therefore the action played at the second stage depends only on σi and on
the ﬁrst public signal and so on, by induction.
Corollary 2.4. b E∞ = E∞.
To emphasize the dependence on the player’s own past actions, a strategy that
is not public will be called private. As it will be seen in the sequel, in games with
bounded recall, considering public or private strategies makes a big diﬀerence.
2.3 Bounded recall
Consider now players who recall only recent observations. Informally, a strategy has
recall k, if the player who uses it remembers only what happened on the k previous
stages, and plays in a stationary way, i.e., this player has no clock and relies on her
recall, but not on time. The formal deﬁnition is the following.
Deﬁnition 2.5. Given an integer k ∈ N, the strategy σi ∈ Σi has recall k if there











By convention, a strategy that has recall 0 is a constant mapping on Hi.
Lehrer (1988, 1992a,b) and Bavly and Neyman (2005) use a somewhat diﬀerent
deﬁnition: in those papers, a bounded recall strategy is the choice of an initial recall
plus the mapping f. This implies that whenever the initial recall re-appears during
the course of the game, the player will play in the same way as at early stages. In the
deﬁnition given here, a player plays as she wishes before stage k and then uses the
stationary rule f. We believe that asymptotic results are unlikely to diﬀer using one
or another deﬁnition, however for small values of k, the initialization phase might be
critical. Also note that Sabourian (1998) uses the same deﬁnition as the one given
above.
The set of strategies for player i that have recall k is denoted by Σi
k and Σk :=
×i∈N Σi
k. Since the game is ﬁnite, for each σ ∈ Σk, the sequence at(σ) is eventually
7periodic, i.e. periodic from some stage on, which implies the existence of γi(σ).
The normal form game Γk = hN,(Σi
k),(γi)i is thus well deﬁned and the set of Nash
equilibrium payoﬀs of Γk in pure strategies is denoted by Ek.
Let b Σi
k = b Σi ∩Σi
k be the set of public strategies with recall k, b Γk = hN,(b Σi
k),(γi)i
be the public-strategy game with recall k, and b Ek be the set of its (pure) Nash
equilibrium payoﬀs.
Remark 2.6. In games with bounded recall, considering public strategies is a true
restriction. From Lemma 2.3, every pure strategy σi is equivalent to a public strategy
b σi but the bounded recall property is not preserved. It might be that σi has recall k
but b σi does not. For example, consider trivial monitoring (the mapping ` is constant).
Given any recall k, there is only one history of public signals, thus a public strategy
with bounded recall is a constant strategy. By contrast, a private strategy (of recall 1)
can simply alternate between two actions. The equivalent public strategy alternates
between the two actions according to time and thus is not a public strategy with
bounded recall according to Deﬁnition 2.5.
Remark 2.7. In the game with recall 0, strategies are constant and thus b E0 = E0.
This set further coincides with the set of pure Nash equilibrium payoﬀs of the stage
game.
Remark 2.8. All the equilibrium notions deﬁned in this section might well be empty
since we are dealing with pure strategies. However, when the stage game has a pure
Nash equilibrium, playing this equilibrium at each stage regardless of history is an
equilibrium of the repeated game in any sense deﬁned above: uniform, k-recall public,
k-recall private. The rest of the paper deals mainly with the minority game which
has pure Nash equilibria.
2.4 The repeated minority game
In the minority game (MG) three players have to choose simultaneously one of two
rooms: L (left) or R (right). For each proﬁle of action a = (a1,a2,a3) ∈ {L,R}
3,
call minority room the less crowded room and majority room the most crowed room.
Player i’s payoﬀ is then 1 if she chooses the minority room and 0 otherwise. Hence
the payoﬀ matrix of the MG is as follows, where player 1 chooses the row, player 2









The proﬁle where one player chooses L and the two other players choose R is a
Nash equilibrium. All pure Nash equilibria of this game are obtained by permutation
8of players and rooms. Denote by C be the convex hull of payoﬀ vectors generated by
these equilibria. If e(i) ∈ R3 is the vector whose i-th component is 1 and the other
components are 0, then










It is worth noticing that this is also the set of Pareto-eﬃcient payoﬀs in the game.
Consider now the repeated game where the majority room is publicly observed.
At each stage t = 1,2,..., players choose their room and before stage t + 1, the
majority room is publicly announced: U = {L,R}, and
`(a) =
(
L if #{i : ai = L} ≥ 2,
R if #{i : ai = R} ≥ 2.
The rest of the paper deals with the repeated minority game with these public
signals. The following Folk-theorem-like result holds.
Proposition 2.9. In the minority game E∞ = C.
3 Main results
3.1 Public equilibria and de Bruijn graphs
We give here a combinatorial representation of k-recall strategies using de Bruijn
graphs. We consider a directed graph Tk, where each of the 2k nodes is labeled
by a k-letter word written with the alphabet {L,R}. For i ∈ {1,...,k} let xi ∈
{L,R}. The word x = (x1,...,xk) precedes the word y = (y1,...,yk) if (x2,...,xk) =
(y1,...,yk−1). The word y succeeds x whenever x precedes y. Hence each node (i. e.
the word associated to it) precedes only two nodes. Such a graph is called de Bruijn
graph (see e.g. de Bruijn (1946) and Yoeli (1962) for some properties of these graphs).























































Figure 1. de Bruijn graph T3
A proof of the following result can be found in Yoeli (1962)(see Lempel (1971) for
a generalization to any ﬁnite alphabet).
Proposition 3.1. For every p in {1,...,2k}, there exists in the de Bruijn graph Tk
a cycle with length p.
The link with public strategies is the following. Let σ = (σ1,σ2,σ3) be a k-
recall strategy proﬁle, (at(σ))t the induced sequence of action proﬁles and (ut(σ))t the
induced sequence of public signals. We denote by xt−1 = (ut−k(σ),...,ut−1(σ)) the
public memory before stage t. Let fi : {L,R}k → {L,R} be the mapping associated
to σi and set f = (f1,f2,f3). The mapping f associates to every public memory
x ∈ {L,R}k the next action proﬁle. From stage k on, the play of the game is
perfectly determined by f, that is f(xt−1) = at(σ) for each t > k.
The sequence (xt)t is eventually periodic: there exist two integers t0 and p such
that xt+p = xt, ∀t ≥ t0. The payoﬀ associated to σ is thus the average payoﬀ over a
period: γi(σ) = 1
p
Pt0+p
t=t0+1 gi(f(xt)). Let us call a cycle of σ a tuple (xt+1,...,xt+p)
with t ≥ t0.
Lemma 3.2. If σ is a public equilibrium of Γk, then for each x in the cycle of σ,
f(x) is a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game.
Proof. Otherwise there is an x in the cycle of σ such that f(x) = (L,L,L) (or
= (R,R,R)). Then player 1 deviates and plays R (or L) whenever the public memory
is x and plays like σ1 otherwise. This deviation does not aﬀect the sequence of public
signals and thus does not aﬀect the behavior of other players. It is proﬁtable since at
least once every p stages, player collects a payoﬀ of 1 instead of 0.
Thanks to this lemma, we can restrict our attention to mappings f that map
public memories (i.e. {L,R}k) to Nash equilibria of the one-shot game. Notice now
that a Nash equilibrium of the minority game is fully described by
(i) the player who gets 1 and
10(ii) the majority room.
That is, to specify the mapping f, we must attach to each public memory
(i) a winning player and
(ii) the next public signal.
We can thus describe a strategy proﬁle in the de Bruijn graphs by selecting one
outgoing edge for each node and by coloring the nodes: each node is assigned to a
player, or to nobody if the players are all in the same room. As we said before, in
equilibrium every node is assigned to a player.
Note that a node is assigned to player i when she is the winning player. So if
she changes action at this node, ﬁrst she gets a bad payoﬀ, and second, she does
not change the public signal. A deviation of player i can thus be regarded as an
alternative choice of an outgoing edge at each node that is not assigned to her.
To sum up, a public equilibrium in the k-recall game can be described as follows:
• for each node of Tk, one outgoing edge and one player ar chosen in such a way
that
• no player i can induce a more proﬁtable cycle in the graph by changing outgoing
edges at nodes not assigned to her.
3.2 Some public equilibria
We describe now some public equilibrium payoﬀs.






















As shown by the proofs of these results, the representation of strategies in de Bruijn
graphs is fundamental to determine bounded-recall equilibria in the minority game.
The constructions will identify in the graphs cycles that represent the equilibrium
play, and will correctly assign a player to each node.
Remark 3.4. Deﬁne the eﬀective recall of a strategy as the smallest k for which this
strategy has recall k. In our equilibrium constructions, the eﬀective recall of the three
players are diﬀerent. For instance when k = 3, in the equilibrium of Lemma 3.3(a)
the eﬀective recalls of the three players are 0, 0, and 3, respectively. In fact player 1
always plays L, player 2 always plays R. In (b) the recalls are 1, 3, and 3, and in (c)
they are 1, 2, and 3. The following question, raised by an anonymous referee, remains
open: does there exist an equilibrium payoﬀ in b Ek, such that in every equilibrium
yelding this payoﬀ with recall at most k and public strategies, all the strategies of the
players have eﬀective recall k?
11The partial results of Lemma 3.3 enable us to completely describe the set of public
equilibrium payoﬀs for small values of k.
Proposition 3.5. (a) b E0 = {(1,0,0),(0,1,0),(0,0,1)}.
























































Note that for k ≤ 2, all public equilibrium payoﬀs are on the boundary of the







∈ b E3, so when the
recall is k ≥ 3 there exists a public equilibrium payoﬀ in the interior of C.
3.3 Convergence of b Ek
We use the standard notion of Hausdorﬀ convergence of closed sets and get the fol-
lowing convergence result.
Theorem 3.6. In the minority game limk→+∞ b Ek = E∞ = C, that is for every ε > 0,
there exists k0 such that for each x in C and each k ≥ k0, there exists y ∈ Ek such
that kx − yk ≤ ε.
The construction, like standard Folk-theorems, uses a main path and punishments.
Players agree on a cycle over the set of stage-Nash equilibria leading approximately
to the target payoﬀ. Since only stage-equilibria are played, a deviation that does
not modify the signals is not proﬁtable. When players see unexpected signals, they
punish the deviator by staying for a long time in the same room where they were at
the deviation stage. The punishment is eﬀective since only a player who gets a zero
payoﬀ (i.e., is not alone in a room) can modify the signal. Before the deviation signal
leaves the public recall, players re-write it in the recall. Two players can do so by
playing the same action thus controlling the public signal. The detailed construction
is given in Section 5.
Remark 3.7. Theorem 3.6 easily extends to a (2n + 1)-player minority game (each
player has to choose between L and R and receives a payoﬀ of 1 if she is in the
minority room and zero otherwise). However, the proof heavily relies on the speciﬁc
properties of the game and signal function. Since convergence of b Ek to E∞ is not
always guaranteed, a challenging and open problem is to characterize limk b Ek.
3.4 Private equilibria
The following proposition shows that under bounded recall, the set of private equilib-
rium payoﬀs is strictly larger than the set of public equilibrium payoﬀs. Furthermore,
private equilibria may not be equilibria of the unbounded-recall, i.e. uniform equilib-
ria, and we ﬁnd a private equilibrium payoﬀ for k = 3 which lies outside E∞.







∈ E2 \ b E2.
(b) In the minority game (3/7,3/7,0) ∈ E3 and thus E3 6⊂ E∞.
This last point is proved by constructing explicitly an equilibrium σ = (σ1,σ2,σ3)
of Γ3 with payoﬀ (3/7,3/7,0). The proof is quite lengthy and involved and seems to
indicate that more general results in this direction are quite hard to obtain.
As mentioned in the introduction, Mailath et al. (2002) and Kandori and Obara
(2006) compare the behavior of public and private strategies in games with public sig-
nals and unbounded recall. Proposition 3.8 does something of that sort in a bounded
recall framework.
4 Beyond the minority game
The main message of the paper is that, for the game under study, equilibria are quite
hard to analyze and even asymptotic results requires a lot of structure and involved
constructions, compared to regular Folk theorems. We conclude with two examples
of other games showing that such phenomena are bound to appear in many cases.
Let us ﬁrst consider a game with perfect monitoring. In this case, public and
private equilibria coincide. The following example shows that even under perfect
monitoring, convergence of (b Ek)k to E∞ may fail.
There are three players, N = {1,2,3}. Player 3 only has one action, player 1
chooses the line, player 2 chooses the column, and as usual the ﬁrst (resp. second,









Players with unbounded recall get (0,0,1) in (uniform) equilibrium: player 1 plays
T and player 2 alternates between L and R with the correct frequencies. Since
√
2 is
irrational, these frequencies must also be irrational but players with bounded recall
eventually enter a cycle on a ﬁnite number of actions, generating rational frequencies.
Proposition 4.1. (a) The payoﬀ (0,0,1) ∈ E∞.
(b) The set b Ek = Ek = {(0,0,0)}.
We know from the study of the minority game that private bounded recall equi-
libria may not be equilibria of the unrestricted game. We strengthen this result by
giving an example where there is a payoﬀ in ∩k≥1Ek\E∞, i.e. there exists a bounded
recall equilibrium payoﬀ bounded away from E∞ as k grows.
13Consider the following two-player game, with A1 = {T,M,B1,B2}, A2 = {L,R}













Proposition 4.2. In the above game, for each k ≥ 1, the payoﬀ (2,4/3) ∈ Ek, but
(2,4/3) 6∈ E∞.
5 Proofs
The following general lemma will be used in the sequel.
Lemma 5.1. (a) If a strategy σ is an equilibrium of b Γk, then σ is a uniform equilib-
rium of b Γ∞. Thus, b Ek ⊂ b E∞.
(b) If a strategy σ is an equilibrium of b Γk, then σ is an equilibrium of Γk. Thus,
b Ek ⊂ Ek.
(c) If a strategy σ is an equilibrium of b Γk, then σ is an equilibrium of b Γk+1. Thus,
b Ek ⊂ b Ek+1.
Proof. (a) This kind of result is common in the literature on games with bounded
complexity (see e.g., Neyman (1998), Ben-Porath (1993), Lehrer (1988, 1994)) and
relies on a usual dynamic programming argument. Let σ be an equilibrium of b Γk.
For each player i, ﬁnding a best reply in Σi to σ−i amounts to solving a dynamic
programming problem, where the state space is Uk, the set of public histories of
length k, the action space is Ai, the payoﬀ in state h = (u1,...,uk), given action
ai is gi(ai,σ−i(h)), and the new state is (u2,...,uk,`(ai,σ−i(h))). It is well known
(see Blackwell (1962)) that there exists a stationary optimal strategy. Thus, the best
reply of player i to a proﬁle of public strategies with recall k is a public strategy
with recall k (see Abreu and Rubinstein (1988, Lemma 1)). Therefore σ is a uniform
equilibrium of Γ∞.
(b) This follows directly from the previous point. The game b Γk is a subgame of Γk
in the sense that the set of strategies of each player in b Γk is a subset of the set of
strategies of this player in Γk. Let then σ be a strategy proﬁle in b Γk, if σ is not an
equilibrium of Γk, then a player i has a proﬁtable deviation in Σi
k ⊂ Σi, thus σ is not
a uniform equilibrium contradicting the previous point.
14(c) The argument is similar to the one used for point (b), b Γk is a subgame of b Γk+1:
any strategy with recall k can be played in the game with recall k + 1. So, if a
strategy proﬁle σ in b Γk is not an equilibrium of b Γk+1, then some player i has a
proﬁtable deviation in b Σi
k+1 ⊂ Σi, thus σ is not a uniform equilibrium contradicting
point (a).
Proof of Proposition 2.9. This follows directly from the characterization given in Tomala
(1998, Theorem 5.1, page 104), but we provide a simple direct proof. First note that,
since C is the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoﬀs of the one-shot game, then
C ⊂ E∞. Given any point x in C, one can ﬁnd a sequence of Nash equilibria (at)t of
the minority game, such that the average payoﬀ vector along this sequence converges
to x. Then, the strategy proﬁle such that for each player i and stage t, player i plays
ai
t at stage t, irrespective of the history, is clearly a uniform equilibrium with payoﬀ
x.
To get the converse, note that there are two types of action proﬁles: either two
players are in the same room and the proﬁle is an equilibrium of the MG, or the
three players are in the same room. In the latter case, each player has a proﬁtable
deviation (she prefers to switch room) and further this deviation does not change the
majority room, i.e., the public signal. If at a strategy proﬁle the three players are
in the same room on a non-negligible set of stages, then player 1 can switch rooms
at these stages. This increases her payoﬀ at these stages without aﬀecting public
signals, hence without aﬀecting the behavior of the other players. Such a strategy
proﬁle cannot be a uniform equilibrium and therefore E∞ ⊂ C.
The following notation and terminology will be used in the sequel.
L
p = L···L | {z }
p times
, R
q = R···R | {z }
q times
.
Call word any ﬁnite sequence of signals. Given two words u = (u1,...,up) and
v = (v1,...,vq), denote by uv the concatenated word uv = (u1,...,up,v1,...,vq).
Consider the minority game with recall k, and its associated de Bruijn graph Tk.
Call m-cycle a cycle of length m, and call stable the cycles where all the nodes have
the same number of L’s. Among the stable cycles having s L’s, say, call main all the
cycles containing the nodes LsRk−s or Rk−sLs. In Tk there are k − 1 main k-cycles
and 2 main 1-cycles.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. (a) Consider the (k+1)-cycle that contains Rk and all the nodes
whose label contains just one L. In equilibrium, players cycle on this (k + 1)-cycle
and elsewhere they go to this cycle as fast as possible.
Assign node Rk to player 2 and all the other nodes in the graph to player 1.
Player 1 can deviate only on Rk, and she has no incentive to do it, because that
would induce a cycle on the node Rk, that is assigned to player 2. Player 2 can deviate
15anywhere else, but she has no incentive to do it, since she cannot ﬁnd a cycle that
contains Rk and is shorter than the equilibrium cycle.
Player 3 can always deviate, but, since she would get a zero payoﬀ anyway, she
has no incentive to deviate.
















































(b) For every s ∈ {1,...,k} assign nodes Rk−sLs to player 2, nodes Lk−sRs to player 3,
and the other nodes to player 1. In equilibrium players cycle on the main k-cycles
and elsewhere they move to the closest main cycle.
Assume for instance that we start with the memory Lk. The closest main k-cycle









Remark that all nodes are assigned to player 1 except Lk−1R and RLk−1. Assume
that player 1 deviates at node Lk−1R. The next node is Lk−2R2 which is not assigned
to her. If she deviates again, the next node is still not assigned to her, and so on. Thus,
her only possibility to collect payoﬀs is to stop deviating and follow the equilibrium.
Indeed, when player 1 is at a node not assigned to her, under the equilibrium strategy
she will be winning at the next k − 2 nodes whereas if she deviates she will spend
more time in nodes where she gets 0.
More generally, consider a node where player 1 could possibly deviate, namely the
nodes assigned either to player 2 or to player 3. One can check that
1. any deviation in a node not assigned to player 1 leads to another node not
assigned to player 1,
2. the shortest path from that node to the closest node assigned to player 1 is
via an equilibrium path, the shortest path from that node to the second closest
node assigned to player 1 is via an equilibrium path, and so on.
16Therefore any non-equilibrium cycle that is forced by player 1 with a ﬁnite sequence
of deviations is longer than k and the proportion of nodes in this cycle assigned to
player 1 cannot be larger than (k−2)/k. Thus there is no ﬁnite sequence of deviations
that would make player 1 better oﬀ.
For instance, if k = 3, deviating in LLL (resp. RRR) would force the 1-cycle
LLL··· (resp.RRR···). Deviating in LLR (resp. RRL) would increase the distance
to the next 1-node from 1 to at least 3, hence the deviation would be proﬁtable only
if it induced a 5-cycle with two nodes assigned to player 1, but this is not possible
since player 1 cannot deviate on her own nodes. Deviating in RLL (resp. LRR)
would increase the distance to the next 1-node from 2 to at least 3. Using the same
argument as before, we can see that this deviation is not proﬁtable.
The argument is similar for the other players. Consider now a node where player 2
could possibly deviate, namely the nodes assigned either to player 1 or to player 3.
It is not diﬃcult to verify that
1. any deviation in a node not assigned to player 2 leads to another node not
assigned to player 2,
2. the shortest path from that node to the closest node assigned to player 2 is
via an equilibrium path, the shortest path from that node to the second closest
node assigned to player 2 is via an equilibrium path, and so on.
Therefore any non-equilibrium cycle that is forced by player 2 with a ﬁnite sequence
of deviations is longer than k and the proportion of nodes in this cycle assigned to
player 2 cannot be larger than 1/k.








































































































Proof of Proposition 3.5. (a) By Remark 2.7, the only possible Nash equilibria of b E0
are repetitions of the same Nash equilibrium of the stage game.

















∈ b E1. No other equilibrium payoﬀ can be obtained with recall 1,
since the maximal length of a cycle in the de Bruijn graph T1 is 2.




































No other equilibrium payoﬀ can be obtained with recall 2.







6∈ b E2. In fact the maximal length of a cycle in the
de Bruijn graph T2 is 4. Hence, in order to obtain such a payoﬀ in equilibrium, the
players would have to cycle on a 3-cycle of T2, and each node should be assigned
to a diﬀerent player. There are only two such cycles. Take for instance the cycle
LL → LR → RL, and assume that these nodes are assigned to players 1, 2, and 3,
respectively. Then player 2 deviating in RL induces the cycle LR → RL → LR...
and gets a payoﬀ of 1

































Figure 5. de Bruijn graph T2







(or its permutations) cannot be obtained
at equilibrium. Consider the only 4-cycle in the graph T2, namely, LL → LR →







or its permutations. In fact if
(i1,i2,i3,i4) denotes the strategy proﬁle that assigns LL to player i1, LR to player i2,








• (1,1,2,3) is not an equilibrium, since player 3 would deviate in LR,
• (1,1,3,2) is not an equilibrium, since player 2 would deviate in LR,
• (1,2,1,3) is not an equilibrium, since player 3 would deviate in LR, and player 2
would deviate in RL,
• (1,3,1,2) is not an equilibrium, since player 2 would deviate in LR, and player 3
would deviate in RL,
• (1,2,3,1) is not an equilibrium, since player 1 would deviate in LR,
• (1,3,2,1) is not an equilibrium, since player 1 would deviate in LR,
• (2,1,1,3) is not an equilibrium, since player 1 would deviate in RL,
• (3,1,1,2) is not an equilibrium, since player 1 would deviate in RL,
• (2,1,3,1) is not an equilibrium, since player 2 would deviate in LR, and player 3
would deviate in RL,
• (3,1,2,1) is not an equilibrium, since player 3 would deviate in LR, and player 2
would deviate in RL,
• (3,2,1,1) is not an equilibrium, since player 2 would deviate in RL,
• (2,3,1,1) is not an equilibrium, since player 3 would deviate in RL.






or its permutations, either. Using
the same notation as before
• (1,1,1,2) is not an equilibrium, since player 2 would deviate in LR,
• (1,1,2,1) is not an equilibrium, since player 2 would deviate in RL,
• (1,2,1,1) is not an equilibrium, since player 2 would deviate in RL,
• (2,1,1,1) is not an equilibrium, since player 2 would deviate in LR.
Proof of Theorem 3.6. Let m ≥ 2 be an integer and let Cm be the set of vectors
of x ∈ C with rational components of the form xi = mi/m with mi ≥ 2 integers.
Then Cm converges to C as m goes to inﬁnity i.e. supx∈C infy∈Cm kx − yk goes to 0
as m goes to inﬁnity. Therefore Theorem 3.6 follows from Lemma 5.1(c) and from
Lemma 5.2 below.
Lemma 5.2. For every integers m ≥ 2 and K ≥ 2m, Cm ⊂ b Ek for k = Km.
The following terminology will be used in the proof of Lemma 5.2. A word of
length k is called a public recall. Given a public recall M, a word u of length l ≤ k is
called a sub-word of M if there exist two words v,w (possibly of length 0) such that
M = vuw. The word consisting of L...L, q times is denoted Lq. If u is a sub-word
of M, deﬁne the position of u in M as the rank of the ﬁrst letter of u. For instance,
if M begins with u, then u has position 1; if M ends with u, then u has position
k − l + 1.
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Let m ≥ 2 be an integer and x ∈ Cm. The aim is to construct
a strategy proﬁle σ with payoﬀ x which is an equilibrium of b Γk for k = Km, with
K ≥ 2m. The strategy construction is in a folk-theorem spirit. First the right
payoﬀ is obtained by playing an adapted main path. In case of a detected deviation,
punishments have to be performed. Because of ﬁnite recall, the evidence that a
deviation occurred may disappear from the recall. To get a deviating player to be
punished forever, players are asked to rewrite periodically a word in the public recall,
indicating that a deviation has occurred and which actions should be used to punish.
This construction relies heavily on properties of the minority game and the majority
room as a signal. The following properties will be used extensively.
• A player who is in the minority room at some stage cannot change the signal at
that stage. This implies that a player who gets a payoﬀ of 1 at a given stage has
no incentive to deviate at that stage since it can only decrease the stage-payoﬀ
and has no impact whatsoever on the future.
20• The main path is constructed so that at each stage a Nash equilibrium of the
one-shot game is played. Thus at each stage there is one player in the minority
room and the other two players are in the majority room, both receiving a payoﬀ
of zero. If the signal changes, that means that one of the two players in the
majority room deviated, but the public signal does not tell who did. A simple
way to punish the deviating player without knowing her identity is to apply the
following policy: “If I see a wrong signal at stage t, then I remain in the room
where I was at stage t.” This insures that the deviating player, who was in the
majority room when the deviation was detected, remains in the majority room
as long as the punishment phase lasts.
• Any payoﬀ vector can be obtained by two action proﬁles giving diﬀerent public
signals (just exchange L and R).
• Two players can write any word in the public recall, whatever the behavior of
the third player is.
Pick now a point x = (xi)i ∈ Cm. Then x =
P
i xie(i), where for each i ∈ N,
xi = mi/m, with mi ≥ 2, so xi ≥ 2/m. Let H = (a∗
1,...,a∗
m) ∈ Am be a sequence of
action proﬁles of length m such that









2. the public history (`(a∗
1),...,`(a∗
m)) associated to H is Lm.
Such a sequence exists: it suﬃces to play a sequence of Nash equilibria of the MG
such that player i gains 1 exactly mi times and the majority room is always L. For
each room r ∈ {L,R}, let ¯ r be the other room, and, if a is an action proﬁle, let
¯ a be the action proﬁle where every player has switched room. Let ¯ H ∈ Am be the
sequence obtained from H by switching rooms: ¯ H = (¯ a∗
1,...,¯ a∗
m). The main path
will be the periodic repetition of the sequence H ¯ H. Here is how to construct a proﬁle
of strategies of recall k that generates this periodic sequence of action proﬁles.
Let W := Lm be the word induced by H. A word w is a sub-word of W if w = Lq
with 0 ≤ q ≤ m. If a periodic repetition of H ¯ H is played, at each stage the public
recall ends by a word of the type ¯ Ww or W ¯ w with w sub-word of W (possibly of
length 0). Call such words end-words. An end-word writes either LmRq or RmLq,
0 ≤ q < m. The aim is to play a periodic repetition of H ¯ H. In order to do that, at
each stage knowledge of the end-word is suﬃcient to know what action proﬁle should
be played at the next stage. Thus, letting E be the set of end-words, there exists
a mapping f which maps E to pure Nash equilibria of the MG and such that for
21each end-word e, f(e) = (fi(e))i∈N is the action proﬁle that follows e in the periodic
repetition of H ¯ H.
Consider now deviations. After each end-word e, f(e) should be played. On the
main path f(e) induces a winning player i(e) and a signal r(e). If ¯ r(e) is observed,
then some player j 6= i(e) has deviated. Let us call deviation-word, a word of the type
e¯ r(e): a deviation word writes either LmRqL or RmLqR, 0 ≤ q < m. If a deviation-
word e¯ r(e) appears in the recall, the strategy prescribes to keep playing f(e) as long
as the position of e¯ r(e) is greater than 2m. During this punishing phase the signal
is completely controlled by the punished player, hence this player could write in the
recall another deviation-word e0¯ r(e0). To prevent other end-words to appear in the
recall, if Lm−1 (resp. Rm−1) appears, all players must play R (resp. L). Finally, when
the position of e¯ r(e) becomes less than or equal to 2m, the players must rewrite this
word in the recall by all playing the same actions for an appropriate number of times.
The exact deﬁnition of the strategy proﬁle σ is given now.
• Initialization. At the ﬁrst m stages each players plays L. For the next m
stages, each player plays R, for the next m stages each player plays L, and so
on until stage k.
• Main path. If the recall contains no deviation-word and ends by the end-word
e, each player i plays fi(e).
• Early punishments.
– If the recall contains a deviation-word e¯ r(e) whose position is greater than
2m, and if the recall does not end by Lm−1 or by Rm−1, then each player
i plays fi(e).
– If the recall contains a deviation-word e¯ r(e) whose position is greater than
2m, and if the recall ends by Lm−1, then each player i plays R.
– If the recall contains a deviation-word e¯ r(e) whose position is greater than
2m, and if the recall ends by Rm−1, then each player i plays L.
• Late punishments. If the recall contains a deviation word e¯ r(e) = LmRqL
with 0 ≤ q < m, let p be its position.
– If m < p ≤ 2m, then each player i plays L.
– If m − q < p ≤ m, then each player i plays R.
– If p = m − q, then each player i plays L.
And similarly for e¯ r(e) = RmLqR.
• Other memories. For all other memories, each player plays L.
22It remains to prove that the above-deﬁned strategy proﬁle σ has payoﬀ x and is
an equilibrium of b Γk.
If all players play this strategy, the public recall after stage k is either LmRm ...LmRm
or LmRm ...LmRmLm depending on the parity of K. It ends by an end-word e and
contains no deviation word. The next action proﬁle is then f(e) and the public recall
still ends by an end-word so the strategy uses f again. By construction of f, this
strategy proﬁle generates the periodic repetition of H ¯ H and the payoﬀ is indeed x.
Suppose that player i deviates. First, player i cannot modify the signals in the
initialization phase, and, since this phase is transient, it is irrelevant for payoﬀs. We
consider thus deviations at later stages.
If the deviation never changes the signals, then player i changes action only at
stages where she was in the minority room. Therefore she loses payoﬀ at these
stages and does not aﬀect the behavior of other players. Such a deviation is thus not
proﬁtable.
Suppose now that player i changes the signal at some stage, therefore i is in the
majority room at this stage. This generates a deviation-word e¯ r(e). As long as the
position of e¯ r(e) is greater than 2m, the other players play f(e) so player i receives a
payoﬀ of zero, except if she generates words of the type Lm−1 or Rm−1. In such cases,
the other players will play both R or both L. Such situations appear at most every
m stages. So, the only opportunities to player i to gain a payoﬀ of 1 are when other
players rewrite the deviations word (at most 2m stages), and once every m stages for
















since xi ≥ 2/m, and K ≥ 2m.
Proof of Proposition 3.8. (a) First remark that with private strategies player i can
play a periodic sequence of actions with cycle RLL by using a strategy that relies
on her own actions only, and does not regard public signals whatsoever. Therefore




where the i-th row indicates the strategy of the i-th player. This is clearly an equi-
librium of Γ2: it is a repetition of one-stage Nash equilibria so no player can increase
her stage payoﬀ by deviating and further, since player do not regard public signals,















is not in b E2.
(b) We construct an equilibrium σ = (σ1,σ2,σ3) of Γ3 with payoﬀ (3/7,3/7,0). Given
strategies of recall 3, the action played by a player at some stage depends only on
her last 3 actions and on the last 3 public signals. The last 3∧t actions or signals at
time t will be called available.
The proﬁle σ is deﬁned as follows:
(a) If at least one available public signal is R, then σ recommends to each player to
switch room, i.e., to play L if she played R at the previous stage, and vice-versa.
(b) Assume now that all available public signals are L.
(b1) Regarding the ﬁrst three stages, as long as the public signal is L, σ recommends
to play as follows:
stage → 1 2 3
P1 L L R
P2 R L L
P3 L R L
For example, the symbol R in line P3 means that at stage 2, σ3 asks player 3
to play R if the public signal of stage 1 was L.
(b2) At every stage t ≥ 3, if the last 3 public signals are L, then each player i ∈
{1,2,3} plays the action fi(ai
t−3,ai
t−2,ai
t−1) ∈ {L,R} where ai
t0 denotes the
action played by player i at stage t0 and the functions f1, f2, f3 are described
below.
last own actions P1 P2 P3
LLL R R L
LLR R L L
LRL L R L
LRR L L L
RLL L L L
RLR L R L
RRL R L L
RRR L L L
Figure 6
At the intersection of column P2 and line RLL, the symbol L means that
f2(RLL) = L, i.e., at any stage t ≥ 3, if the last 3 public signals were L, and
the last actions played by player 2 were R (at stage t − 3), L (at stage t − 2),
and L (at stage t − 1), then player 2 following σ2 should play L. This ends the
deﬁnition of σ.
24The proof is complete once Lemma 5.3 below is proved.
Lemma 5.3. (a) The payoﬀ induced by σ is (3/7,3/7,0).
(b) The strategy σ is an equilibrium of Γ3.
Proof. (a) Assume that σ is played. The induced play can be represented as follows.
stage → 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
action P1 L L 
 R 
 R L 
 R L L L 
 R 
 R L 
 R ...
action P2 
 R L L L 
 R L 
 R 
 R L L L 
 R L ...
action P3 L 
 R L L L L L L L L L L L ...
public signal L L L L L L L L L L L L L ...
Figure 7
The action of a player in the minority room, if any, is emphasized with a circle. The
public signal is L at every stage, the induced play eventually has period 7 (one can
see a period from stage 3 to stage 9), and the induced payoﬀ is (3/7,3/7,0).
(b) This part is a direct consequence of the next three lemmata, where the best reply
condition is checked for every player.
Lemma 5.4. In Γ3, σ3 is a best reply against σ−3.
Proof. Let τ3 be any strategy of player 3 in Σ3
3. It is necessary to prove that
γ3(τ3,σ−3) ≤ γ3(σ) = 0. Assume in the sequel that (τ3,σ−3) is played, and dis-
tinguish two cases.
Case 1. Assume that the sequence of public signals never contains the symbol R.
Then the sequence of actions played by players 1 and 2 is the same as in Figure 7.
So at stages 3,4,5,6 player 3 is playing L (otherwise the public signal will be R at
some stage). Since τ3 has recall 3, it implies that player 3 will play L at every stage
t ≥ 3. Since L is at each stage the majority room, γ3(τ3,σ−3) = 0.
Case 2. Assume that at some stage the public signal is R. Consider the ﬁrst stage ¯ t
where this happens. Up to stage ¯ t, the actions played by player 1 and 2 correspond to
Figure 7, so at stage ¯ t it is not possible that both players 1 and 2 play R. Consequently,
at stage ¯ t: either (players 1 and 3 play R and player 2 plays L), or (players 2 and
3 play R and player 1 plays L). Recall now that σ1 and σ2 ask players 1 and 2 to
change rooms whenever one of the available signals is R.
As long as one of the available public signals is R, players 1 and 2 will exchange
rooms at each stage and, since players 1 and 2 are not in the same room, the payoﬀ
for player 3 will be zero. So to get out of this punishment phase, player 3 has to
play three consecutive times L in order to induce three consecutive signals L. So it is
25possible to assume w.l.o.g. that there exists a stage t where the situation is as follows:
stage → t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3
action P1 L R L L(a)
action P2 R L R R(b)
action P3 L L L
public signal L L L
or
stage → t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3
action P1 R L R L(c)
action P2 L R L R(d)
action P3 L L L
public signal L L L
Figure 8
(a) because f1(L,R,L) = L (see Figure 6),
(b) because f2(R,L,R) = R,
(c) because f1(R,L,R) = L,
(d) because f2(L,R,L) = R.
If player 3 plays R at stage t + 3, then at this stage (players 1 and 3 play R and
player 2 plays L) or (players 2 and 3 play R and player 1 plays L), and player 3 does
not get out of the punishment phase where players 1 and 2 exchange rooms at each
stage, and player 3’s payoﬀ is zero at each stage.
So let us assume that player 3 plays L at stage t + 3. But since τ3 has recall 3,
player 3 will continue to play L as long as the public signal is L. The situation at the
end of stage t+2 is similar to the situation at the end of stage 7 (left table) or stage
6 (right table) of Figure 7, and from this stage on player 3 will be in the majority
room (the L room) hence will also have payoﬀ zero. So γ3(τ3,σ−3) = 0.
Lemma 5.5. In Γ3, σ1 is a best reply against σ−1.
Proof. Let τ1 be a strategy proﬁle of player 1 in Σ1
3. It is necessary to prove that
γ1(τ1,σ−1) ≤ γ1(σ) = 3/7. Assume that (τ1,σ−1) is played. Two cases are possible.
Case 1. Assume that at each stage the public signal is L. Then the situation is as
follows:
stage → 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
action P1 L L X Y L Z L L
action P2 
 R L L L 
 R L 
 R 
 R L L L
action P3 L 
 R L L L L L L L L L ...
public signal L L L L L L L L L L L ...
with X, Y , Z in {L,R}.
If (X,Y ) = (L,L), then player 1 only plays L since σ1 has recall 3. And
γ1(τ1,σ−1) = 0 ≤ 3/7. So it is possible to assume w.l.o.g. that (X,Y ) 6= (L,L).
The same argument shows that Z = R.
If (X,Y ) = (L,R), then the actions played by player 1 are LLLRLRLL. Since
signals are assumed to be L at each stage, the next action of player 1 depends on
her available actions only and one sees that is this word, the ﬁrst appearance of LRL
26is followed by R and the second il followed by L. This sequence of actions is thus
unachievable with recall 3. If (X,Y ) = (R,L), then player 1 plays LLR LLR LLR
LLR.... But then at some stage the public signal will be R, yielding a contradiction.
The last case to consider is (X,Y ) = (R,R). In such a case:
stage → 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
action P1 L L 
 R 
 R L 
 R L L T U
action P2 
 R L L L 
 R L 
 R 
 R L L L 
 R L 
 R 
 R L
action P3 L 
 R L L L L L L L L L L L L L L ...
public signal L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L ...
If T = R, then player 1 plays the following sequence with period 6: LLRRLR
LLRRLR LLRRLR.... Since player 2 plays a sequence with period 7 and gcd(6,7) =
1, at some stage the signal will be R, yielding a contradiction. So T = L.
Now if U = L, the memory of player 1 at stage 10 is the same than at stage 9.
She will thus plays always L and get a payoﬀ of zero. If U = R, this is exactly in the
case of Figure 7, and γ1(τ1,σ−1) = 3/7.
Case 2. Assume that there exists some stage where the public signal is R. It is possible
to proceed as in the proof of Lemma 5.4 (Case 2). Since f2(L,R,L) = f2(R,L,R) = R
and f3(L,R,L) = f3(R,L,R) = L, also in this case γ1(τ1,σ−1) = 0 ≤ 3/7.
Lemma 5.6. In Γ3, σ2 is a best reply against σ−2.
Proof. Let τ2 in Σ2
3 be a strategy of player 2. It is necessary to show that γ2(τ2,σ−2) ≤
3/7 = γ2(σ). Assume for the sake of contradiction that γ2(τ2,σ−2) > 3/7.
Claim. It cannot happen that at some stage, both players 1 and 3 play R.
Assume on the contrary that there exists a ﬁrst stage ¯ t where both player 1 and
player 3 play R. Necessarily ¯ t ≥ 3 and since player 3 plays R at ¯ t, ¯ t cannot be the
ﬁrst stage where the signal is R. So there exists some stage b t < ¯ t such that the signal
at stage b t is R, and the signal at every stage t, b t < t < ¯ t is L.
Since player 3 plays R at ¯ t, then ¯ t ≤ b t+3. By deﬁnition of ¯ t, at stage b t: the signal
is R, either player 1 or player 3 play L, and player 2 plays R. So after stage b t, players
1 and 3 start to exchange rooms and this contradicts the fact that both player 1 and
player 3 play R at ¯ t.
Given this claim, two cases, and several sub-cases are possible.
Case 1. Assume that eventually the sequence of signals only contains L. There exists
¯ t with ut(τ2,σ−2) = L for all t ≥ ¯ t.
Then for each stage t ≥ ¯ t + 3, player 3 will play L (see Figure 6), and given the
deﬁnition of f1, player 1 will eventually play the following sequence with period 7:
LLLRRLR LLLRRLR LLLRRLR...
Since it was assumed that γ2(τ2,σ−2) > 3/7, there must exist 7 consecutive stages
among which player 2 is in the minority room for at least 4 stages. Since the majority
27room should be L from some stage on, the sequence played by player 2 depends on
her own actions only and therefore has period at most 23 = 8. One can then check
that the only possibility for player 2 to win at least 4 times out of seven is to play the
periodic sequence RRRLLRL RRRLLRL RRRLLRL..., so there must exist t ≥ ¯ t
such that the play is:
stage → t +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 +10 +11 +12 +13
action P1 L L L 
 R 
 R L 
 R L L L 
 R 





 R L L 
 R L 
 R 
 R 
 R L L 
 R L
action P3 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
public signal L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
This sequence of actions of player 2 will be denoted by ω in the sequel.
Subcase 1.a. Assume that all signals are L. Then the situation is as follows.
stage → 1 2 3 4
action P1 L L R R
action P2 X L L L
action P3 L R L L
public signal L L L L
It must be X = R otherwise player 2 only plays L and γ2(τ2,σ−2) = 0. So player 2,
at stage 4, plays L after RLL. This is not compatible with the sequence ω.
Subcase 1.b. Assume that there exists a last stage ¯ t where the public signal is R.
Since player 1 and player 3 never play R at the same time, two possibilities can occur
at stage ¯ t.
Subsubcase 1.b.1. If player 1 plays R at stage ¯ t, then
stage → ¯ t +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
action P1 R L(a) R(a) L(a) L(b) L(c) R(d)
action P2 R L(e) L(e) L(e) X Y L(e)
action P3 L R(a) L(a) R(a) L L L L
public signal R L L L L L L L
(a) player 1 and player 3 change rooms after a public signal R,
(b) because f1(L,R,L) = L,
(c) because f1(R,L,L) = L,
(d) because f1(L,L,L) = R,
(e) by assumption, the signal has to be L at every stage ≥ ¯ t + 1.
If X = L, then player 2 will always play L and have a payoﬀ of zero. So X = R.
Then Y = L because of the periodic sequence ω. But using ω again, at stage ¯ t + 6
player 2 should play R, yielding a contradiction.
28Subsubcase 1.b.2. If player 3 plays R at stage ¯ t, then
stage → ¯ t +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9
action P1 L R L R L L L R R L
action P2 R L L L X Y Z L L
action P3 R L R L L L L L L
public signal R L L L L L L L L L
It must be that X = R, otherwise player 2 will always play L after ¯ t. The sequence
ω then gives Y = L, and Z = R. But by ω again at stage ¯ t + 7, player 2 should play
R, yielding a contradiction.
Case 2. It remains to consider the case with an inﬁnite number of stages where the
public signal is R.
Take any interval of stages {t1,...,t2}, where t1 < t2, ut1(τ2,σ−2) = ut2(τ2,σ−2) =
R, and for every t ∈ {t1 + 1,...,t2 − 1}, ut(τ2,σ−2) = L. To conclude the proof, it
is suﬃcient to show that the average payoﬀ of player 2 at stages t1,...,t2 − 1 is at
most 3/7.
Assume by contradiction that it is not the case, i.e., assume that the average
payoﬀ of player 2 at stages t1,...,t2 − 1 is greater than 3/7. Since player 1 and
player 3 never play R at the same stage, at stage t1, either (players 1 and 2 play R,
player 3 plays L) or (players 3 and 2 play R, player 1 plays L). In each case, players
1 and 3 are going to exchange rooms at stages t1 + 1,t1 + 2,t1 + 3, so the payoﬀ of
player 2 is zero at each stage t in {t1,t1 + 1,t1 + 2,t1 + 3}. It was assumed that the
average payoﬀ of player 2 between stage t1 and stage t2 −1 is greater than 3/7. This
implies that t2 ≥ t1 + 8. So the signal at stages t1 + 1,...,t1 + 7 is L. Two cases are
possible.
Subcase 2.a. At stage t1, player 3 plays L.
stage → t1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 ... t2
action P1 R L 
 R L L L 
 R 
 R L ... R
action P2 R L L L X Y L L Z ... R
action P3 
 L 
 R L 
 R L L L L L ... 
 L
public signal R L L L L L L L L ... R
By a standard argument X = R (otherwise player 2 plays only L and gets 0). If
Y = L, then, since player 2 has recall 3
t1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 +10 +11 +12 +13 +14 +15 t2
P1 R L 
 R L L L 
 R 
 R L 
 R L L L 
 R R L R
P2 R L L L 
 R L L L 
 R L L L 
 R L L L R
P3 
 L 
 R L 
 R L L L L L L L L L L L L 
 L
signal R L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L R
29Then t2 = t1 + 16, and the average payoﬀ of player 2 is 3/16. So to conclude
subcase 2.a., it remains to consider the case when Y = R.
stage → t1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9
action P1 R L 
 R L L L 
 R 
 R L R
action P2 R L L L 
 R 
 R L L Z T
action P3 
 L 
 R L 
 R L L L L L L
public signal R L L L L L L L L
Since player 2 has recall 3 and the memory RLL was met at stage t1 + 3, Z = L,
and since LLL was met at stage t1 + 4, we have T = R. Thus, t2 = t1 + 9 and the
average payoﬀ of player 2 is at most 3/9.
Subcase 2.b. At stage t1, player 1 plays L.
stage → t1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 +10
action P1 
 L 
 R L 
 R L L L 
 R 
 R L(d) R(f)
action P2 R L L L 
 R
(a) Y Z L L(b)
action P3 R L 
 R L L L L L L L(d) L(f)
public signal R L L L L L L L L(c) L(e)
(a) standard argument because player 2 has recall 3,
(b) the only possibility is L otherwise there is no chance for the average payoﬀ of
player 2 to be greater than 3/7. Furthermore (b) implies (c), (c) implies (d), (d) implies
(e), and (e) implies (f).
Now, (Y,Z) = (L,L) is not possible because player 2 would play LLLL at stages
t1 + 5,t1 + 6,t1 + 7,t1 + 8. The case (Y,Z) = (L,R) also is not possible, because
player 2 would have to play the same action at both stages t1 + 6 and t1 + 8.
Assume that (Y,Z) = (R,L). Then
stage → t1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 +10
action P1 
 L 
 R L 
 R L L L 
 R 
 R L R
action P2 R L L L 
 R 
 R L L L 
 R R
action P3 R L 
 R L L L L L L L 
 L
public signal R L L L L L L L L L R
Here t2 = t1 + 10. The average payoﬀ for player 2 at stages t1,t1 + 1,...,t2 − 1 is
only 3/10. The last case to consider is (Y,Z) = (R,R).
stage → t1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 +10
action P1 
 L 
 R L 
 R L L L 
 R 
 R L R
action P2 R L L L 
 R 
 R 
 R L L X0 Y 0
action P3 R L 
 R L L L L L L L L
public signal R L L L L L L L L L
Necessarily Y 0 = R, and t2 = t1 +10. The average payoﬀ for player 2 is then at most
4/10 (< 3/7).
30Proof of Proposition 4.1. (a) Note that (0,0,1) ∈ E∞ by the classical folk theorem.
This payoﬀ is feasible by a sequence of action proﬁles where player 1 plays T at











. Player 1 punishes deviations from player 2 by playing B and player 2
punishes by playing R.
(b) Consider now bounded recall strategies. Take k in N and (x,y,z) in Ek (= b Ek).
Since the play induced by a pure strategy proﬁle with bounded recall is periodic, the
average frequencies λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4 of the pure action proﬁles (respectively of (T,L),








z = λ1 + λ2.
By individual rationality x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0, so λ1
√
2 = λ2. Since
√
2 is irrational,
this implies λ1 = λ2 = 0. So (x,y,z) = (0,0,0). Since (0,0,0) is an equilibrium
payoﬀ, one obtains Ek = {(0,0,0)} for each k.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Consider a pure equilibrium of the repeated game with un-
bounded recall. If at some stage (M,L) is played, then player 2 may play R at
this stage and get a payoﬀ of 3 instead of 2, without any further consequence be-
cause the signal induced by (M,R) is the same as the signal induced by (M,L).
Thus, in equilibrium, (M,L) cannot be played with positive frequency, and therefore
E∞ ⊂ {(x,y) ∈ R2,x + y ≤ 3}.
Fix a positive integer k and deﬁne σ = (σ1,σ2) ∈ Σk as follows.
• σ2 plays L at each stage whatever happens.
• σ1 plays B1 at stage 1, and is deﬁned via a main phase and a transition phase.
After stage 1, player 1 using σ1 says that she is in the main phase if and only if
(all public signals in her recall equal u, and the last action played by player 1
is not T). If this condition is not satisﬁed, then player 1 says that she is in the
transition phase.
– In the transition phase, player 1 plays B1 if her last k actions all equal T,
and plays T otherwise.
– In the main phase, player 1 induces the following periodic sequence of
actions
B1B1 ...B1 | {z }
k times
B2B2 ...B2 | {z }
k times
MM ...M | {z }
k times
B1B1 ...B1 | {z }
k times
B2B2 ...B2 | {z }
k times
MM ...M | {z }
k times
...
That is, player 1 plays B2 (resp. M, resp. B1) if her last k actions are all
B1 (resp. B2, resp. M), and repeats her last action otherwise.
31This ends the deﬁnition of σ.

























We check now that σ is an equilibrium of Γk.
The strategy σ1 is obviously a best response against σ2 because the maximal payoﬀ
for player 1 is 2. Let now τ2 be any strategy of player 2 with recall k and assume that
γ2(σ1,τ2) > 1. There must exist some ﬁrst stage ¯ t where player 1 plays M. Then
necessarily the following happened:
stage → ¯ t − 2k ... ¯ t − (k + 1) ¯ t − k ... ¯ t − 1 ¯ t
action P1 B1 ... B1 B2 ... B2 M
public signal u ... u u ... u
This implies that player 2 has played L and the signal was u at every stage ¯ t −
2k,...,¯ t − 1. Since 2k > k and τ2 has recall k, player 2 using τ2 will play L at every
stage t ≥ ¯ t − 2k. So γ2(σ1,τ2) = 4/3 = γ2(σ). Consequently σ2 is a best response
against σ1 in the game with private strategies and recall 3, and (2,4/3) ∈ Ek. Hence
(2,4/3) ∈ ∩k≥1Ek\E∞.
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